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CONSTRUCTION AT ANDREWS AIR FORCE BASE

THIRTEENTH INTERMEDIATE REPORT

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON EXPENDITURES IN THE EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENTS

MARCH 20, 1952.—Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union and ordered to be printed with illustrations

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LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
Washington, D. C., March 20, 1952.

Hon. SAM RAYBURN,
Speaker of the House of Representatives,
Washington, D. C.

DEAR MR. SPEAKER: By direction of the Committee on Expenditures in the Executive Departments, I submit herewith the thirteenth intermediate report of its subcommittee.

WILLIAM L. DAWSON, *Chairman.*

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82D CONGRESS, 2d Session } HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES { REPORT No. 1623

CONSTRUCTION AT ANDREWS AIR FORCE BASE

MARCH 20, 1952.—Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union and ordered to be printed

Mr. DAWSON, from the Committee on Expenditures in the Executive Departments, submitted the following

THIRTEENTH INTERMEDIATE REPORT

On March 20, 1952, a majority of the members of the Committee on Expenditures in the Executive Departments agreed to and signed the report of the Government Operations Subcommittee on its inquiry into construction at Andrews Air Force Base.

The chairman was directed to transmit a copy to the Speaker of the House.

PART I—INTRODUCTION

As an important facet of its study and investigation of defense spending, this subcommittee has undertaken to examine the items contained in the Military and Naval Construction Act of 1951. This statute authorized the construction of projects at hundreds of installations here and abroad at a cost of $5.78 billion. It will, of course, be possible for the committee to cover only a relatively small number of these projects. Hence, its aim will be to concentrate on broad aspects of the construction work at particular installations in the hope that the results of the study may be applied to similar situations elsewhere in the construction program.

The subcommittee has approached this subject with a full appreciation of the fact that the program has been approved by the Armed Services Committees and Appropriations Committees of both the House and Senate. There is a realization, also, that the Congress itself has passed the necessary legislation giving the program the force and effect of law. However, coupled with these facts is the knowledge that under existing procedures the Congress and its committees are virtually powerless to get behind the ex parte or one-sided presentation made by the spending agency. Consequently, this subcommittee will not confine its consideration to the manner in which the funds appropriated are being expended, but will be on the alert for facts not

previously presented to the Congress which suggest serious doubt that the money should be spent at all.

Perhaps it would be helpful, too, for the subcommittee to express the underlying thinking which will characterize its examination of, and conclusions with respect to, these military construction items. The defenses of this Nation must be strengthened not only to repel any attack which may be made upon it but as a deterrent to any nation which may be thinking along those lines. On this we can all agree. But in building up we must keep ever present in mind the possibly more imminent danger of spending ourselves to bankruptcy. The size of our national debt and the burden of high taxes will be oppressive enough even if only the essential items are procured or constructed. There is no room for waste, frills, or nonessentials.

One of the first installations to be examined was Andrews Air Force Base at nearby Camp Springs, Md. This base occupies 4,489 acres of Government land and was initially occupied in May 1943. It was constructed primarily to base a fighter-interceptor squadron for the defense of Washington. Another major function of Andrews is to provide administrative space and flying facilities for the Military Air Transport Service (MATS). The Air Force has contended that the present facilities to support this planned mission are inadequate and that there are no suitable facilities at any other base which might be utilized. (See p. 497, Hearings on Military Public Works Appropriations for 1952, Subcommittee of the Appropriations Committee, House of Representatives.) At that time it was said:

> All existing facilities are being utilized but must be augmented with new 25-year-life construction.

The staff of the subcommittee examined carefully all the documentary support for the construction items requested at Andrews. Thereafter, several trips to the base were made in order to coordinate the physical aspects of the existing and programed facilities with those contained in the records of the Air Force and the Corps of Engineers, the constructing agency. The subcommittee held hearings in executive session where it heard witnesses from the Air Force, the Army Corps of Engineers, and the Public Buildings Administration. In addition, certain documentary evidence has been made part of the subcommittee's record.

PART II—PLANNING

There was considerable evidence that lack of proper advance planning for construction items is unnecessarily increasing the cost of the work, impairing the efficiency of operations, and resulting in the presentation to committees of the Congress of an incomplete, incorrect, or otherwise misleading picture. To some extent this may be unavoidable by reason of the exigencies under which the need develops but there are indications that much more of it is attributable to a desire to rush ahead without taking the time to properly evaluate the need or the means to satisfy it.

The very first item in the construction program at Andrews furnishes an apt illustration. The Congress authorized and appropriated $14,000 for a washrack to be constructed there. Apparently, the use of such a facility is a new concept in military aviation equipment, the washing of planes having been done heretofore on a parking apron.

After presenting the 1952 budget program to the Congress the Air Force was granted authority to build 46 washracks in various amounts, the majority being estimated to cost $14,000 each.

It was testified that at the time the cost of the washrack at Andrews was estimated the thinking was that it would only be a piece of parking space with a special drain. After the authorization and appropriation were granted, the thinking changed until finally it called for a strip, a pump house, four high-pressure water stations, air connections, solvent service lines, electrical cables, and electrical outlets for night operation. As thus conceived there were two types, one of which would cost $117,000 and one $169,000. At this point the Air Force recommitted the project for further study with a view to scaling down the cost.

As of February 12, 1952, no definite plans for washracks had been agreed upon and the entire program was in abeyance. Assurance was given by the Director of Installations, Air Force, that if the new concept of washrack exceeded in scope the one originally planned additional authority from Congress would be requested. It does seem, however, that such a lack of detailed planning before coming to the Congress, as is evident in the case of the washrack program, cannot help but result in representations being made which are of little value as a guide to the end use of appropriated funds.

But inadequate planning apparently is not confined to the period antedating the authorization and appropriation acts. In the second supplemental program for the fiscal year 1951 (Public Laws 910 and 911, both approved January 6, 1951) $80,000 was included for the construction of one bachelor officers' quarters (BOQ) at Andrews. The Air Force maintained that there arose an immediate need for this BOQ in order that a number of WAF's then occupying a hospital ward and certain nurses' quarters could be moved into it. Consequently, as soon as the law was passed there began a mad rush to get the building constructed. The result was a real "comedy of errors," though a taxpayer might find it difficult to see any humor.

On January 11, 1951, the Chief of Engineers (OCE) issued a directive to the Construction-Operations Division, reading in part:

(2) ENGINEERING INSTRUCTIONS

(*b*) *Bachelor Officers Quarters*

1. The USAF definitive drawing, titled Bachelor Officer's Quarters, Drawing No. DEF. 25–06–24, Sheets 1 and 2, will be used as a guide for the design of this building;
2. Capacity of this building will be based on double occupancy providing 21 rooms;
3. Mass facilities will not be provided.

This directive was subsequently amended by penciling out subhead 1 and substituting the following:

Design shall be in accord w/20 man Bachelor Officer's Quarters, Drawing No. 21–01–09, Sheets 1–4, inclusive, modified for local conditions. Above drawings have been previously furnished your office.

It was explained at the hearings that the Air Force had no definitive drawing to give the engineers for the construction of this BOQ so they used a design for one built in Alaska. That is the plan referred to as 21–01–09 in the amended directive. However, the Alaskan plan called for a building with 40 rooms whereas the building re-

quested by the Air Force was one with 21 rooms. The Air Force maintains they intended that only half the building as constructed in Alaska would be built. In any event bids were requested on a 40-room BOQ.

At some point after the bids were opened, but before the award of the contract, it became known that the building would cost more than double the original estimate and upon inquiry it was found that a mistake had been made. The engineers had misinterpreted the amended directive and had let out bids on a building double the size actually requested by the Air Force. But up to this point, other than the loss of time, no damage had been done. The Air Force was apprised of the error, it being necessary for the engineers to secure from them an additional allotment of funds, and advice was requested as to what to do. On the same day the error was made known to Air Force Headquarters, the engineers were told to go ahead with the 40-room BOQ. Consequently, a building which was programed as an $80,000 item wound up costing about $177,000.

The engineers frankly admitted "gross error" at the hearings. The Air Force at one point admitted that they built twice as much as they were authorized and that this was in direct violation of instructions to the field command to the effect that no changes should be made in the program as presented to and defended before the Congress. Subsequently, however, the position was taken that congressional authority was not exceeded inasmuch as facilities were authorized by broad categories and not by specific station totals.

Whether or not there was any actual violation of law involved in the decision of the Air Force to build double the size BOQ requested and authorized, there certainly was a breach of faith with the Congress and its cognizant committees. The process by which public moneys are made available to executive agencies could well become a complete farce if agencies do not adhere at least reasonably close to the program they justify.

Moreover, the haste which attended this BOQ project resulted in another questionable development. The BOQ was sited according to a master plan which was drawn up apparently without any visual inspection of the land. At least, no soil tests were made and no time was afforded the contractor to make borings. These could have been made in 4 or 5 days. Within a week after the contractor began work it was discovered that the site was almost a swamp. A revision of the plans was necessary and under the change orders issued the cost of the work was increased by about $22,000.

At the hearings both the engineers and the Air Force attempted to minimize the swampy condition of the site. They stated that such bogs are common in the Andrews area; that much of the water was found to be coming from an overflow from a nearby reservoir; that this situation was corrected; and that the site was as satisfactory as any other that could be found at Andrews. However, it was stated that no attempt was made to find any other site and that relocation of the BOQ's would have disrupted the master plan.

Subsequent to the hearings staff representatives visited Andrews again, on a day when there had been no rain for 2 weeks previous. Pictures taken at the site (attached as exhibit A) show the land to be swampy and practically impassable by foot. The BOQ as well as the road in front of it are on filled land some 3 or 4 feet above the swampy land. Significantly, also, staff representatives toured the entire base

that same day and no other surface water was visible in any other spot. And yet, it is proposed to site four additional BOQ's in this same location. The conclusion seems impelling that the BOQ was sited according to a master plan which was improperly drawn but which admittedly was intended only as a guide. The failure to deviate from it when the condition of the site became known seems likewise attributable to the haste attending the entire operation.

PART III—EXPEDITING CONSTRUCTION

The construction of this first BOQ is illustrative of another practice which undoubtedly has resulted in years past in a tremendous dissipation of public funds. That is the practice of paying a contractor a higher price to get the work done in a short period of time. The Congress recently enacted a prohibition against the use of military construction funds for paying additional costs involved in expediting construction (sec. 603, Public Law 254, approved November 1, 1951). Unfortunately, however, the prohibition was not enacted soon enough to prevent an outright extravagance at Andrews.

Due to the extreme emergency alleged by the Air Force in connection with its need for this BOQ, bids were invited on an alternate basis calling for completion in either 60 or 90 days. The acceptable bid was $7,000 higher for the earlier completion date. The Air Force authorized acceptance of the higher bid because, as above stated, hospital space occupied by some WAF's was needed for evacuees being returned from Korea. On the face of it the reasons seem logical enough; but what do the facts show?

Actually, on May 4, 1951, when the BOQ was ready for occupancy, only 21 WAF's were transferred from the hospital; 25 other WAF's were transferred from the nurses' quarters but at that time there were no nurses stationed at Andrews. The patients were being taken care of by male orderlies and it was not until June 18, 1951, that four nurses were transferred there. Subsequently four more were assigned there and that is all presently located there. The building was available for "beneficial occupancy," though certain minor items had not been completed, in 64 days after work began. So for the 26 days saved by accepting the higher bid the Government spent $7,000 and the need was to house 21 WAF's for that time. Simple arithmetic tells us that amounts to $13 per day per WAF, or more than double what it would cost to put them up at the best hotel in Washington on a two-to-a-room basis.

Moreover, included in the change order which issued after the condition of the soil was discovered was a provision extending the time for completion to 120 days. The engineers disclaim the significance of this extension and contend that the beneficial occupancy could not have been secured in 64 days without the $7,000 additional payment. Of course, whether this be so or not, it was utterly ridiculous to spend a sum of money so disproportionate to the benefit derived.

PART IV—TYPES OF CONSTRUCTION

It is the policy of the Air Force at the present time to use two standards of construction; one is called the 25-year life and the other the 10-year life. The former is used on permanent bases to accom-

modate the July 1, 1950 (48 wing) strength of the Air Force; for bases not planned for retention in the postemergency period or for strength over and above that existing on July 1, 1950, they use the so-called semipermanent or 10-year construction. During the hearings on the military public works appropriations for 1952, the 25-year-life construction was described as follows:

> It consists of the maximum use of on-site materials, wood or concrete framing, continuous foundation, shingle roofs, dry-wall interior, concealed wiring and plumbing, hardwood or composition floors, with good-quality fixtures.

And the 10-year life was described:

> That consists of a prefabricated, wood shell, or like light frame, on-grade slabs or piers with a light shingle or tar-paper roof, with only essential interior trim and seal and good-quality fixtures (p. 64, House hearings).

The statements made at those and other congressional hearings relative to these two types of construction are entirely misleading, Principally, the term "10-year life" is a complete misnomer. That type building is designed to last many more than 10 years. In fact, there was testimony from qualified engineers that the masonry 10-year Air Force building will last from 75 to 100 years. Such a building is made out of reinforced concrete and the main difference between it and the 25-year life or permanent building is that it has a 4-ply instead of a 5-ply roof. So while the roof on the 10-year-life building may not last as long as that on the 25-year-life building, there is no difference whatever in the life expectancy of the building.

Another misleading feature of the quoted statement is the description of 10-year-life construction insofar as it refers to a "prefabricated, woodshell, or like light frame." There is absolutely no difference whatever in the framework of the two buildings. This was conceded during the hearings before the subcommittee by Air Force officials who also admitted that their testimony before the Appropriations Committee is misleading to that extent. They explained, however, that at the time the statements were made they had in mind the possibility of using a prefabricated shell but that their thinking had changed. There is attached as exhibit B a graphic comparison of the characteristics of 10- and 25-year-life construction.

The record before the subcommittee is replete with evidence that the existing Air Force policy with respect to 10- and 25-year-life construction is unsound. If economy is actually the underlying reason for it—as is contended by the Air Force—then it is specious economy in the extreme. However, considering the permanency of the 10-year-life buildings, there is some basis for thinking that the present emergency is being used as an excuse to justify a build-up in facilities for future peacetime years far beyond what has been represented to the Congress. Nor is the use of this so-called semipermanent type construction the only basis for arriving at this conclusion. As will be seen hereafter, the policy with respect to the replacement of existing facilities follows the same pattern.

However, since economy is alleged to be the justification for the policy let us see what the record shows. The estimated cost of 10-year-life barracks for the 1953 program is $1,940 per man as against $2,020 for the 25-year life, a percentage difference of about 4 percent. The figures given by the Air Force for the construction of BOQ's are $6,100 per man for 10-year life and $6,350 for 25-year life, likewise

a difference of almost 4 percent. In the wood-frame type, the interior beams in the 10-year-life building are left exposed, constituting a fire hazard. The inferior roof will, of course, require greater maintenance costs and possibly replacement at a higher cost than would be involved were the 5-ply roof put on originally. Competent engineers are of the opinion that an inferior roof is poor economy in any event.

Moreover, it is questionable whether the Air Force construction policy conforms to a directive issued by the Secretary of Defense to the Secretaries of the Army, Navy, and Air Force on February 12, 1951. The subject was Review of Service, Public Works Programs for Third Supplemental, Fiscal Years 1951 and 1952.

3. Standards of Construction

Permanent-type construction, exclusive of family housing (see par. 19), will be limited to—

a. Those projects which are independent of troop strength and for which the need is demonstrably permanent;

b. Those permanent installations in continental United States, and overseas such as Alaska and Okinawa, to accommodate the demonstrably permanent requirements at each installation for the authorized budgetary strength of the forces in being on July 1, 1950.

The remainder of the projects proposed will be temporary construction except in those instances where in each case a demonstrably semipermanent need can be established.

The Air Force plans no temporary construction whatever except for overseas bases. In other words, considering the insignificant difference in both physical characteristics and cost between the 10-year and 25-year life construction, it might be concluded that the Air Force program calls for all permanent construction. Certainly that is not in line with the tenor of the directive from the Secretary of Defense, as quoted above. Of course, this is just another instance where it is not so much the policy that is laid down but how that policy is construed and carried out.

The new dormitory-type buildings at Andrews, of which 40 are now in various stages of construction, are as good if not better than any college dormitory in the country. There is not evident in the planning of these buildings even a scintilla of the "austerity" which is supposed to characterize the military public-works program. While the subcommittee is keenly aware of the necessity for adequate troop housing, both from the standpoint of welfare and morale, the conclusion is inescapable that these new buildings could be scaled down in design and cost without impairing their essential purpose. (See pictures attached as exhibit C.)

PART V.—NEED FOR NEW BARRACKS AND QUARTERS

The Department of Defense policy with respect to the replacement of existing facilities has been expressed as being:

Facilities will be included in this program for replacement only if their retention would result in hazardous operations, unhealthy living or working conditions, or excessive maintenance cost (15 percent of replacement cost per year). If practical, this replacement will be phased over 3 years.

At the present time there are 63 barrack buildings at Andrews. Of these 54 are of masonry construction and 9 of wood-frame construction. These buildings are considered by the Air Force to be "beyond economical repair" and it is their purpose to replace them with new

dormitory-type buildings. This determination was made by the Installations Board of the Air Force and applied to all "theater of operations" type buildings throughout the country. It was testified, however, that no inspection of the buildings at Andrews had been made incident to their being declared "beyond economical repair" and that no attempt had been made to estimate the cost of modernizing the buildings.

A disturbing fact to the subcommittee is certain testimony that was given in describing these buildings and their physical condition. At one point it was stated:

> They are twenty- by a hundred-foot buildings, slab-on-grade floors; some of them have the tar-paper siding, others the cinder-block siding with tar-paper roof; heated with space heaters, so-called pot-bellied stoves. No plumbing in them. The plumbing is in a separate latrine outside.

It developed later in the testimony that some did have plumbing but it remained for staff members to revisit Andrews and have actual photographs taken before the subcommittee obtained a true picture of what these existing buildings were and particularly a true version of their present physical condition.

The facts of the matter are that the buildings are all in reasonably good condition; that they have been recently painted; that considerable money was spent last summer in modernizing some of them, including the replacement of the pot-bellied stoves with floor furnaces and the installation of new plumbing in the latrines; that there was evident no tar-paper sidings or roofs anywhere at Andrews; that only two sets of nine buildings each have outside latrines, the rest of the buildings all having latrines inside the buildings; and that such rehabilitation and repair as is necessary could be effected with comparatively little expense. These facts are supported by photographs attached to this report as exhibit D.

At the request of the subcommittee the Air Force submitted an estimate of the cost of modernizing the existing buildings, which is attached as exhibit E. It will be noted that these estimates of $1,368.40 per man for wooden frame and $1,264.20 for masonry buildings have reference to work consisting of repairing existing structure, strengthening the frame, putting on a new permanent roof and siding (if frame), painting and waterproofing exterior walls (if masonry), enclosing the foundation; installing asphalt tile floors, installing a new heating system, installing new doors and windows and installing partitions to make six rooms out of each 20- by 100-foot barracks. These figures are in comparison to the cost new of about $2,000 per man.

On the face of it, the Air Force seems to make out a fairly good case for new construction, particularly since some of the arguments they put forward as justification for replacing the existing theater of operations buildings may be well taken. However, actual observation at Andrews, as recorded by photographs, indicates that many of the work items are themselves unnecessary. There was evident no pressing need for such work as painting, new roofs, new floors, new windows and doors, new siding, enclosing the foundation, or even the partitions. It is entirely likely that the last item—partitions—provides the clue to the entire Air Force policy with respect to new barracks construction.

The Air Force has adopted a policy of providing single rooms for occupancy by two or sometimes three airmen as a substitute for the barracks-type building used by the Army—and incidentally used by the Air Force until its separation from the Army by the Unification Act of 1947. Their argument is that airmen are on duty at all hours of the day and night so that they require a degree of privacy for sleeping purposes. It is not the purpose of this subcommittee to take issue with that policy, though its application might be open to question in some situations, but there is not perceived in the policy sufficient basis to warrant the construction of new dormitory-type buildings where existing barrack-type buildings are available in good condition.

As previously indicated, 40 barracks programed for the fiscal year 1951 are under construction at Andrews. It is proposed to build 7 more under the 1952 program; each building will be of reinforced concrete construction, have 3 floors, and designed to house 196 men. The design for these buildings will not be completed until March 31, 1952. There is every reason to believe that a realistic survey of the existing buildings at Andrews will disclose no essential need for any of these seven buildings. These buildings are estimated to cost $3,283,000.

The 1951 program called for the construction of one BOQ at Andrews; that is the one already built and presently occupied by WAF's. The 1952 program calls for the construction of four more BOQ's. The record shows that only one of these four is necessary to house officers stationed at Andrews—the others being intended for occupation by officers stationed in the Pentagon and elsewhere in the Washington area. These four buildings were estimated in the budget to cost $960,000.

Air Force officials testified that the policy of providing space at Andrews for all bachelor officers in the Washington area was one of recent adoption. It was decided upon about a year ago—in other words, after the outbreak of the Korean war and the proclamation of a national emergency.

The subcommittee seriously questions the adoption of such a policy as this at the present time. Figures were submitted to show a savings to the Government over periods of 30 or 40 years by providing quarters in lieu of commutation to bachelor officers. Without questioning these figures, the large capital outlay involved in the construction of these buildings—not to mention the use of critical construction materials—suggests that such projects should be indefinitely deferred. Certainly it is difficult to reconcile such a policy with statements by top-level Air Force officials that funds are being asked only for absolutely essential facilities. Accordingly, the subcommittee feels that three of these four BOQ's should be eliminated from the 1952 program and that the funds made available for their construction should be withdrawn.

PART VI—PROGRESS OF CONSTRUCTION

If the progress of work at Andrews is to be used as a criterion, there is some indication that the Air Force is requesting of the Congress authorization and funds far beyond their capacity to construct or even get under way during the fiscal year for which the request is made.

There are attached hereto, as exhibit F, schedules showing the progress of each of the projects requested for Andrews during the fiscal years 1951 and 1952.

As will be seen these projects are far from complete. In fact, the only 1951 project 100 percent completed is the one BOQ discussed earlier in this report. Serious consideration should be given by the appropriate committees of the Congress to the question of whether it is sound and logical to legislate programs which have little prospect of even being started during the coming fiscal year. It could be that the Air Force and the Corps of Engineers should concentrate their effort on finishing what they have started before they launch into other projects. The indications are that they already have enough on their hands, at least at Andrews, to keep them busy for some time.

PART VII—SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS

1. There is evident in the public-works program at Andrews a lack of necessary advance planning. This is typified by the washrack requested in the 1952 program for which $14,000 was authorized and appropriated. After the legislation was enacted the Air Force began detailed planning for construction of the washrack and before they were through the facility for which $14,000 had been made available was estimated to cost over $100,000. Such planning should be done before not after an agency comes before the Congress and its committees requesting funds.

A lack of planning coupled with an unwarranted rush to get a new bachelor officers' quarters constructed resulted in the building of a structure with 40 rooms instead of 20 or double the size of the one intended and authorized. While it is difficult to understand how the Corps of Engineers could have misinterpreted the instructions given them, in view of the express language in one paragraph that the building was to have 21 rooms, it is even more disturbing to learn how lightly the Air Force regards the representations made to congressional committees in advance of authorization and appropriation acts. They seem to have a feeling that if action is legal from a technical standpoint, it is also proper. The subcommittee wishes unequivocally to express itself, for the enlightenment of the Air Force and other executive agencies, that the budget which is justified to the Congress should not be deviated from to any material extent. If conditions change and new requirements develop, the only proper course is to come back to the Congress for new authority. Otherwise, it may become necessary for the Congress to incorporate the budget items in the statutes, thus rendering any deviation therefrom illegal.

Finally, with respect to advance planning, the drawing of master plans for air bases is obviously a very desirable procedure. However, there is evidence that the master plan at Andrews was treated as inviolate rather than as a guide, resulting in the building of a BOQ on land which has all the appearances of a swamp. The mad rush to get the building erected prevented the taking of any soil tests, which could have been done in 4 or 5 days, with the result that at least $22,000 additional had to be expended. If four other BOQ's are to be erected on that same site, as now contemplated, it will be necessary

to fill in the land not only for the buildings but for the road in front of them. With all the land available at Andrews it seems that some effort should have been made to find a more suitable site.

2. The facts under which the Air Force authorized the expenditure of $7,000 in order to have a BOQ erected in 60 rather than 90 days indicate a shameful waste of public funds. It was represented that the building was urgently needed for occupancy by members of the Women's Air Force (WAF) in order to make hospital space available for wounded being returned from Korea. However, for the $7,000 spent the Government secured space for only 21 WAF's for 26 days. That is at the rate of approximately $13 a day each—or double what it would have cost to put them up at the best hotel in Washington for that time.

3. The process by which it was determined that the existing barracks buildings at Andrews are "beyond economical repair" is inexcusable. Apparently no visual inspection was made of these particular buildings, as well as no prior attempt to estimate the cost of rehabilitating them. The description of the buildings given to the subcommittee by top-level Air Force officials was misleading. The buildings are in reasonably good condition or could be made so with the expenditure of comparatively little money. The policy of providing single rooms for occupancy by two or three airmen is not based on such essential grounds as to justify the abandonment of barrack-type buildings and the construction of new expensive dormitories. There is reason to believe that rehabilitation of the existing barracks at Andrews will eliminate the need for the seven new buildings authorized in the 1952 program and result in a saving of about $3,000,000.

3A. About a year ago the Air Force adopted the policy of providing quarters at Andrews for all bachelor officers in the Washington area. In pursuance of that policy it is proposed to spend about $750,000 for three new BOQ's. The subcommittee cannot reconcile the adoption of such a policy during the present emergency with the stated purpose of the Air Force to request only absolutely essential facilities at the present time. The subcommittee fully appreciates that there is likely to be less opposition to requests by the military for funds now, due to unsettled world conditions, than there might be in a period of peace. However, this must be an "austerity" program; our financial situation will not permit any other. So, we cannot countenance any attempt by the military services to use the present emergency as a ripe opportunity to provide themselves with facilities and equipment they can presently do without but which they might have difficulty securing funds for at some later date.

4. It is the present policy of the Air Force to use two types of construction: 10-year life (semipermanent) and 25-year life (permanent). Designating these two types of construction in this manner is completely misleading and admittedly unjustified even by Air Force officials. The difference between the two types is insignificant in both physical characteristics and cost. The saving in dollars—estimated to be only about 4 percent for the 1953 program—is false economy. It is like buying a Ford for $3,400 when you can buy a Cadillac for $3,500. No attempt has been made to find any other type of temporary or semipermanent construction.

PART VIII—RECOMMENDATIONS

(*a*) *Administrative*

1. Projects for which authorization and appropriations are to be requested of the Congress should be the subject of careful and adequate planning in advance of the request.

2. "Crash" procedures, where speed is the byword and orderly procedures are sacrificed, should be employed only in extreme situations and then only upon the most convincing evidence that they are justified.

3. Master plans should be drawn in advance of construction at air bases but they should not be regarded as inviolate where changed or previously unknown conditions render them impracticable.

4. In the fixing of completion dates for construction work a careful regard should be had for the known fact that contractors may be expected to submit higher bids for "rush" jobs.

5. Existing facilities should be used to the ultimate and no request for replacements should be made until a realistic appraisal has been made that they are "beyond economical repair." Such an appraisal should involve a visual survey of the property by competent engineers and be supportable by repair cost records for several prior years.

6. There is no such essential basis for the Air Force policy of providing single rooms for occupancy by two or three airmen as to justify the construction of new dormitories or even the reconstruction of existing barracks, and it is recommended that such a policy be regarded as secondary in future requests for new construction.

7. The policy of providing quarters at Andrews for all bachelor Air Force officers in the Washington area should be reviewed. It should be abandoned, at least for the duration of the emergency, unless there are more compelling reasons than those presented to this subcommittee.

8. The existing policy with respect to the use of 10-year-life construction should be abandoned. An attempt should be made to find some more economical type of semipermanent or temporary construction.

9. The Air Force should be guided by these findings and recommendations not only with respect to construction at Andrews but throughout their program.

10. A complete survey should be made by the Air Force of their programed construction in light of the principles set out in this report and such changes made therein as may be appropriate.

11. Henceforth the Air Force should adhere strictly to the austerity nature of the emergency program which should mean requesting only the essential operational and incidental facilities.

12. In programing future construction, regard should be had for the status of construction already authorized and an attempt should be made "not to bite off more than you can chew."

(*b*) *Legislative*

1. The study made at this one installation points up, in the opinion of this subcommittee, the woefully inadequate procedures now applicable to the congressional consideration of the executive budget requests. It is recommended that there be adopted without delay

some measure which will insure a careful review of appropriation requests by some adequately staffed commission, committee, or agency of the Congress.

2. Action should be taken to eliminate from the funds made available by the Second Supplemental Appropriation Act, 1952, approximately $3,283,000 for new dormitories and $750,000 for new BOQ's. Also, there should be eliminated such additional funds as a Nationwide survey would indicate to be unnecessary under the principles laid down in this report.

3. Consideration should be given to the advisability of including in future appropriation acts for military construction a provision circumscribing the extent to which the spending agency may deviate with impunity from the program it justifies to the Congress and its committees.

APPENDIX

EXHIBIT A1.—Proposed site of new bachelor officers quarters.

EXHIBIT A2.—Proposed site of new bachelor officers quarters.

EXHIBIT B

° ESSENTIAL VARIATIONS IN AIR FORCE STRUCTURES °
FOR 10 & 25 YEAR LIFE
WOOD FRAME & MASONRY CONSTRUCTION

DATE 12 FEB. 1952. AFOAI-CA.

LIFE	TYPE	° EXTERIOR °			° INTERIOR ° ②				
		WALLS	ROOF	PAINTING.	WALLS	PARTITIONS	CEILINGS	FLOORS	PAINTING
PERMANENT **25** YEAR	WOOD FRAME	SIDING + SHEATHING	20 YEAR BUILT-UP OR HEAVY SHINGLES	ALL UNFINISHED SURFACES.	DRY-WALL	DRY-WALL	DRY-WALL	FINISHED HARD WOOD OR ASPHALT TILE	ALL EXPOSED SURFACES
	MASONRY ③	CONCRETE BLOCK	DITTO	DITTO	+20° EXPOSED MASONRY ①	EXPOSED MASONRY	EXPOSED CONCRETE	ASPHALT TILE ON CONCRETE	DITTO
SEMI-PERM. **10** YEAR	WOOD FRAME	SIDING (NO SHEATHING)	10 YEAR BUILT-UP OR LIGHT SHINGLES OR ROLL	DITTO	+20° NO FINISH (STUDS EXPOSED) ①	DRY-WALL ON ONE SIDE OF STUDS ONLY	NO FINISH EXCEPT UNDER ROOFS TO HOLD INSULATION	EXPOSED SOFT WOOD OR CONCRETE ④	NONE
	MASONRY ③	CONCRETE BLOCK	DITTO	DITTO	+20° EXPOSED MASONRY ①	EXPOSED MASONRY	EXPOSED CONCRETE	EXPOSED CONCRETE	NONE

NOTES
① IN 0° AND -20° ZONES UNPAINTED DRY-WALL IS ADDED TO COVER REQUIRED INSULATION.
② FINISH IS VARIED AS REQUIRED TO SATISFY MINIMUM SANITARY & TECHNICAL REQUIREMENTS
③ MASONRY IS NORMALLY USED ONLY WHERE REQUIRED FOR FIRE SAFETY
④ SUB-FLOOR ONLY IN 0° - & - 20° ZONES ON GROUND FLOOR



EXHIBIT C1.—Latrine, new dormitories



EXHIBIT C2.—New dormitories, each block of three windows is one room. Lounges in center glassed section.

EXHIBIT D1.—Old barracks, slightly overcrowded, with pot-bellied stoves.



EXHIBIT D2.—Latrine, renovated old barracks.

EXHIBIT D3.—Old barracks, concrete block construction, renovated last year.



EXHIBIT D4.—Old wooden barracks (only nine of these exist).



EXHIBIT D5.—Typical old barracks, concrete block construction.

EXHIBIT E1

ESTIMATED COST OF MODERNIZING THEATER OF OPERATIONS BUILDINGS

The attached tabulation summarizes the estimated costs for the rehabilitation and modernization of old "theater of operations" type buildings for housing airmen. It has been assumed that the buildings have received average maintenance and average continental United States costs have been applied. Estimates have been made on the original buildings being constructed with both tar-paper-covered walls and masonry-block walls.

The estimated costs contemplate converting the old theater of operations buildings into permanent housing facilities, equivalent in standards to currently constructed airmen's housing. Since the original theater of operations construction did not provide built-in bath and toilet rooms, laundry rooms, and lounge rooms, these facilities are proposed as a new structure, either built between two of the old theater of operations buildings or on the ends of each.

The work involved on the old buildings may be summarized as follows:

(*a*) Repair existing structure.
(*b*) Strengthen frame.
(*c*) New permanent roof.
(*d*) New permanent siding (if frame).
(*e*) Paint and waterproof exterior walls (if masonry).
(*f*) Enclose foundation.
(*g*) Asphalt-tile floors.
(*h*) Heating system.
(*i*) New doors and windows.
(*j*) Partition each 20- x 100-foot barracks to 6 rooms to house 18 men.

Currently constructed airmen's housing includes dormitories, mess building, squadron supply, and administration facilities. The counterparts in old theater of operations buildings have been provided by rehabilitation and modernizing. The cost of the work has been totaled for each structure, indicating the number of men it will serve. This total has been extended, showing the cost per man for each facility and the cost per man for all housing facilities. It is to be noted that the cost figure of $800 to $900 per man, given in the previous testimony for rehabilitation and modernization of theater of operations buildings for barracks, pertained to the first item on the attached tabulation.

A previous study of the proposal to convert existing theater of operations housing into permanent housing, comparable with new airmen's housing being constructed, revealed the following difficulties:

(*a*) Many of the old theater of operations buildings, already far beyond their contemplated life, have little salvage value.

(*b*) Remodeling work is more costly and less attractive to contractors than similar new construction.

(*c*) Though the buildings would be sound structurally, the limitations of the old buildings would result in wasted space, excessive utility runs, excessive land use, and many undesirable compromises in arrangement and physical location of components.

(*d*) The area allowance per man in barracks is now considerably more than when the theater of operations barracks were originally built. Other buildings, such as mess halls, supply, and administration remain capable of handling the original capacity. This condition would result in much inefficiency, due to an insufficient number of men housed in a given area to fully utilize the mess, administration, and supply facilities as originally located.

Since the estimated cost of housing airmen in the reconstructed theater of operations buildings is about 65 percent of the cost of new construction and since there are so many inherent disadvantages in the proposal, it was rejected. Generally, the old theater of operations buildings are being maintained and used for storage or other expedient uses which require a minimum of conversion and rehabilitation.

EXHIBIT E2

Estimate of cost of alterations and additions to theater of operations housing to make facilities comparable to Air Force 25-year facilities

Item	Facility	Estimated cost of work			
		Original wood frame		Original masonry walls	
		Total per building	Total per man	Total per building	Total per man
1	Rehabilitate and modernize theater of operations barracks building, 20 by 100 feet, 6 rooms for 18 men	$14,690	$816.00	$13,224	$735.00
2	New wood-frame toilet, laundry, utility and lounge room joined between 2 barracks where possible for 36 men	13,900	386.00	13,900	386.00
3	Rehabilitate and modernize theater of operations mess building, 40 by 96 feet, for 192 men	21,580	112.40	18,382	95.70
4	Rehabilitate and modernize theater of operations supply building for 304 men	8,346	27.50	7,319	24.00
5	Rehabilitate and modernize theater of operations administration building for 500 men	13,260	26.50	11,794	23.50
	Total cost per man		1,368.40		1,264.20

EXHIBIT E3

Officer strength

	Number	Remarks
Andrews Air Force Base officer strength, June 30, 1950	811	
Washington area officer strength, June 30, 1950	4,407	Includes Andrews 811 and Bolling 512.
Andrews Air Force Base officer strength, Jan. 30, 1952	1,183	
Washington area officer strength, Dec. 31, 1951 (latest statistical run).	5,646	Includes Andrews and Bolling.
Andrews Air Force Base 95-wing officer strength (programed).	989	
Washington area 95-wing officer strength (programed)	3,985	Exclusive of Bolling, Andrews, National Airport and 1130th and 1140th special activities wings.
Andrews Air Force Base 126-wing officer strength (programed).	937	
Washington area 126-wing officer strength (programed)	4,175	Exclusive of Bolling and Andrews.
Andrews Air Force Base officer strength, Jan. 30, 1952	1,183	
Washington area officer strength, Dec. 31, 1951 (latest statistical run).	5,646	Includes Andrews and Bolling.
As of Jan. 30, 1952, officers were housed as follows:		
Andrews bachelor officers in bachelor officers' quarters	51	
Andrews bachelor officers on commutation	83	
Andrews married officers in bachelor officers' quarters	63	
Andrews married officers in family quarters	168	
Andrews married officers on commutation	881	Includes 63 living in bachelor officers' quarters.
Washington area bachelor officers in bachelor officers' quarters (at Bolling)	41	
Washington area bachelor officers on commutation [1]	377	
Additional Washington area bachelor officers [2]	91	
Washington area married officers in family quarters	289	Includes 168 at Andrews; 50, Bolling; 4, Walter Reed; 2, Fort McNair; 4, Fort Myer; 61, Arlington Farms.
Washington area married officers on commutation	4,714	

[1] As shown by records of disbursing officers of Bolling and Fort Myer.

[2] Includes 25 in bachelor officers' quarters at Army Medical Center not on commutation and 1 in bachelor officers' quarters at Fort McNair not on commutation. Balance are on commutation status due to lack of bachelor officers' quarters or because of bona fide dependent status.

TYPE OF CONSTRUCTION: ☒ 25 YR LIFE ☒ 10 YR LIFE ☐ OTHER

COST INDEX

EXHIBIT F-1 (PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES).—DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE

ACQUISITION AND CONSTRUCTION OF REAL PROPERTY

as of

(REVISED) 1 JANUARY 1952

ANDREWS AFB — INSTALLATION
CAMP SPRINGS, MD — LOCATION
N. Atlantic — DIVISION
Washington — DISTRICT

PAGE
INSTAL. NO.
HQ — CMD.

LINE	1 PROJECT	2 QUANTITY	3 BUDGET ESTIMATE	4 CURRENT PROGRAM	5 CURRENT WORKING ESTIMATE	6 DESIGN DATE OF AWARD	7 DESIGN DATE OF COMPL.	8 CONSTRUCTION AWARD-ED	9 CONSTRUCTION DATE OF AWARD OR SCHEDULED	10 CONSTRUCTION % COMP	11 CONSTRUCTION ESTIMATED COMPLETION DATE	12 SCHEDULE OF CONTRACT AWARDS 1 JULY 51	13 1 OCT 51	14 1 JAN 52	15 REMARKS OR DELAYING FACTORS
1	FY 1951 - REGULAR														
2	Globe Com Facil				761				19 Feb. 51	93		✓			Awaiting Gov. Equip.
3	TOTAL FY 1951 REGULAR				761										
4															
5	FY 1951 1st SUP														
6	1S Airfield Pavements	836200 SY	650		1,442				4 Jan. 52	2	15 Sept 52	✓			
7	2S Navigational Aids	-	195		195				4 Jan. 52	6	1 July	✓			
8	3S Fuel Storage	6 hydrants	275		333				9 Aug 51	40	15 April 52	✓			
9	TOTAL FY 1951 1st SUP				1,970										
10															
11															
12	FY 1951 SPECIAL PROJECT PROGRAM - 1st SUP														
13	Globe Com Facilities				1,941				19 Feb. 51	93		✓			Awaiting Gov. Equip.
14	TOTAL FY 1951 SPECIAL PROJECT PROGRAM				1,941										
15															
16	FY 1951 2nd SUP														
17	1SS Parking Apron	170054	409		275				28 Nov. 51	3%	15 Sept. 52	✓			
18	2SS POL Facilities	2500 gals	25		DELETE										
19	3SS Comm Bldg	16005f	22		DELETE										
20	4SS Comm & Electr Shops	12005f	13		DELETE										
21	5SS Alert Hangar W/Power	18150	213		330				21 Sept. 51	10	15 May 52	✓			
22	6SS Readiness Hangar	34568 SY	224		385				12 Dec. 51	3	1 Nov 52	✓			
	TOTAL														

Control Office Form 7, Rev.

PAGE 1 of 2 PAGES

CONSTRUCTION AT ANDREWS AIR FORCE BASE

TYPE OF CONSTRUCTION ☐ 25 YR LIFE ☐ 10 YR LIFE ☐ OTHER

COST INDEX

EXHIBIT F–I (PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES).—DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE

ACQUISITION AND CONSTRUCTION OF REAL PROPERTY

as of

(REVISED) 1 JANUARY 1952

ANDREWS AFB — INSTALLATION
CAMP SPRINGS, MD — LOCATION
N. ATLANTIC — DIVISION
WASHINGTON — DISTRICT
PAGE
INSTAL. NO.
CMD.

LINE	1 PROJECT	2 QUANTITY	3 BUDGET ESTIMATE	4 CURRENT PROGRAM	5 CURRENT WORKING ESTIMATE	6 DESIGN DATE OF AWARD	7 DESIGN DATE OF COMPL.	8 CONSTRUCTION AWARDED	9 CONSTRUCTION DATE OF AWARD OR SCHEDULED	10 CONSTRUCTION % COMP	11 CONSTRUCTION ESTIMATED COMPLETION DATE	12 SCHEDULE OF CONTRACT AWARDS 1 JULY 51	13 1 OCT 51	14 1 JAN 52	15 REMARKS OR DELAYING FACTORS
1	FY 1951 2nd SUP - CONTINUED														
2	7SS Sq Operations	24008 Sq	20		DELETE										
3	8SS Readiness Rm Bks & Mess	15440 Sq	165		154				13 Sep '51	60	1 May	✓			
4	9SS Barracks AM	3000 AM	5,175		8,175				30 June '51	63	1 July '52	✓			
5	10SS BOQ	30	80		177				22 Feb '51	100		✓			
6	11SS Utilities		56		62				4 Jan 52	Incl in facilities above		✓			
7	TOTAL FY 1951 2nd SUP				9,558										
8															
9	FY 1951 SPECIAL PROJECT PROGRAM - 2nd SUP														
10	Homing Beacons				15						1 May 52	✓			Not yet under Contract
11	Globe Com Facilities				2,348				19 Feb '51	93		✓			Awaiting Gov. Equip.
12	Ground Control Approach System				80				29 June '51	68	1 May 52	✓			
13	TOTAL FY 1951 SPECIAL PROJECT PROGRAM - 2nd SUP				2,443										
14															
15															
16															
17															
18															
19															
20															
21															
22															
	TOTAL														

Control Office Form 7, Rev.

PAGE 2 of 2 PAGES

TYPE OF CONSTRUCTION ☐ 25 YR LIFE ☐ 10 YR LIFE ☐ OTHER

COST INDEX

EXHIBIT F-2.—DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE

ACQUISITION AND CONSTRUCTION OF REAL PROPERTY

as of

31 JANUARY 1952

INSTALLATION: Andrews AFB ✓ PAGE

LOCATION: Camp Springs, Md. INSTAL. NO.

DIVISION DISTRICT CMD.

LINE	1 PROJECT	2 QUANTITY	3 BUDGET ESTIMATE 000	4 CURRENT PROGRAM	5 DESIGN WORKING ESTIMATE	6 DESIGN DATE OF AWARD	7 DESIGN DATE OF COMPL.	8 CONSTRUCTION AWARDED	9 CONSTRUCTION DATE OF AWARD OR SCHEDULED	10 CONSTRUCTION % COMP	11 CONSTRUCTION ESTIMATED COMPLETION DATE	12 SCHEDULE OF CONTRACT AWARDS 1 JULY 51	13 1 OCT 51	14 1 JAN 52	15 REMARKS OR DELAYING FACTORS
1	Washrack	1 each	14		-										PROJECT DEFERRED
2	Refueling Facilities	1 hydrant	60		60	Oct '51	Nov 20, '51								DESIGN COMPLETE
3	Hazard Removal		5												DELETED FROM PROG
4	A/C Maint Shop	8000 s/f	132		132	JAN 52	FEB 15, '52								DESIGN 35% Complete
5	Maint Hangar	20,000 s/f	380		380	JAN '52	FEB 15, '52								DESIGN 35% Complete
6	AM Dormitories	1386 sp	3,283		3,283	OCT 51	MAR 31, '52								DESIGN 75% Complete
7	BOQ	168 sp	960		960	SEP 51	FEB 15, '52								DESIGN 90% Complete
8	Security Fence	10,000 l/f	50		50	AUG 51	DEC 12, '51								DESIGN Complete
9	Fire Station 4-Stall	9160 s/f	115		108.3	JUL '51	OCT 29 '51	Yes	DEC 27, 51	*					work started 2 feb 1952
10	Utilities	LS	969		969	OCT '51	JUN 1, '52								DESIGN 35% Complete
11	Hospital (250 bed on 500 bed chassis)		3,784		3748										PROJECT DEFERRED.
12	Dental Clinic (8-Unit)	4224 s/f	76		76										PROJECT DEFERRED.
13	Warehouse, Strat. Stg.	20,000 s/f	168		168	JUL 51	NOV 4, 51	YES	DEC 27, 51	*	OCT 1, 52				work started 18 Jan 52
14	Warehouse	10,000 s/f	84		71	JUL 51	NOV 4, '51	YES	DEC 27, 51	*	OCT 1, 52				work started 18 Jan 52
15	Paint, Dope, & Oil Stge	1,000 s/f	13		13	JUL 51	NOV 13 '51								DESIGN COMPLETE
16	Cold Storage & Meat Cutting	3,500 s/f	74		74	JUL 51	FEB 29, 52								DESIGN 90% Complete
17	Rocket Storage	1,070 s/f	20		20	NOV '51	DEC 14, 51								DESIGN COMPLETE
18	UHF/DF		23		PART OF THE COMMUNICATIONS PROGRAM - FUNDS NOT APPORTIONED										
19															
20				*	Progress to date negligible										
21				Note - Army Anti-Aircraft Units not yet											
22				apportioned to specific bases are not included above.											
	TOTAL		10,187												

Control Office Form 7, Rev.

CONSTRUCTION AT ANDREWS AIR FORCE BASE